In Islamic thought, the relationship between moral responsibility, human will, and the omnipotence of Allah has been a subject of deep debate, especially concerning the concepts of 'good' and 'evil.' Three major theological schools — the Mu'tazila, Mātūridī, and Ash'ari — have developed differing perspectives on whether reason can independently issue moral judgments, and on the relationship between divine command and the human capacity for moral reasoning.

In Islamic thought, the relationship between moral responsibility, human will, and the omnipotence of Allah has been a subject of deep debate, especially concerning the concepts of “good” and “evil.” In this regard, three major theological schools of thought — the Mu’tazila, Mātūridī, and Ash’ari schools — have developed differing perspectives. Each of these schools has approached human moral responsibility, the distinction between good and evil, and the relationship of these concepts to Allah’s justice from a variety of analytical dimensions.

The Mu’tazila school posits that the concept of good can be discerned through rational principles. According to the Mu’tazila, the designation of “good” is contingent upon its capacity to be evaluated through reason and logic. They maintain that Allah’s justice is rooted in the idea that all matters can be comprehended rationally and logically. Within the perspective of Mu’tazila, “good” and “evil” are entirely rational concepts; humans can distinguish between good and evil through reason and moral judgments. The directives issued by Allah are regarded as good because they are recognized as such through reason.

One of the prominent scholars of the Mu’tazila, al-Jubbā’ī, stated his rational approach to good and evil, asserting that Allah’s will is always directed towards what is good. Al-Jubbā’ī defines the concept of “good” as what benefits the servants the most. That is, Allah does what benefits His servants, which constitutes goodness. This view is also held by the scholars of the Basran branch of the Mu’tazila, known as the “Aslah theory.”

Imam Mātūridī, a distinguished figure within the third generation of the Hanafi sect, acknowledges the relationship between Allah’s will and human reason that promotes a mutual balance. Mātūridī’s approach to good and evil balances reason and revelation. According to the Mātūridī school, reason possesses the capacity to distinguish between good and evil; however, this distinction ultimately gains meaning within the boundaries set by revelation. In essence, while reason can make a fundamental distinction between good and evil, what is truly “good” and what is “evil” ultimately depends on revelation. In contrast to the Mu’tazila, the Mātūridī school holds that reason cannot independently issue moral judgments. According to Mātūridī, the matters commanded by Allah are regarded as “good,” yet this goodness can be perceived through the lens of human reason.

The Ash’ari school places significant emphasis on the absolute power of Allah, and this comprehension also influences their perspectives on the concepts of “good” and “evil.” The Ash’aris accept that Allah’s will is absolute; based on this will, all actions can be classified as either good or evil. According to the Ash’aris, if Allah commands something as “good,” it is regarded as such; conversely, if He forbids something as “evil,” it is deemed evil. Consequently, the notion of “good” and “evil” is based on Allah’s will, and thus, human reason is incapable of fully grasping these concepts. Every act and command of Allah is absolutely correct, and His justice transcends the limitations of human reasoning. In the Mātūridī school, Allah commands good, and goodness has an independent existence, whereas in the Ash’ari school, that which Allah commands as good is both divine and beyond the reach of reason.

In conclusion, the concepts of good and evil in Islamic theology have been shaped by the perspectives of various schools of thought. The Mu’tazila asserts that reason can determine good and evil and establish moral judgments; in contrast, the Mātūridī school contends that reason can merely recognize the distinctions between good and evil. The Ash’ari view, which centers on the absolute will of Allah, serves as the foundation of their ethical understanding.

References

  • Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsa. Thk. Abd al-Karim. Beirut: Maktabah Wahbah, 1975.
  • Jawadi, Mohsen. “Three Interpretations of the Moral Good and Bad in Islamic Philosophy.” Journal of Islamic Ethics. 8: 1-2 (2024), pp. 146–172.
  • Sadr Al-Sharia. Al-Muqaddimah Al-Arba. Thk. Saīd Fūdah. Amman: Maktabah Aslein, 2016.